"Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science" by Jerry A. Fodor

A collection of essays dealing with methodological and empirical issues in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind. The book convincingly connects philosophical speculation to concrete empirical research.

One of the outstanding methodological issues dealt with is the status of functionalism considered as an alternative to behavioristic and physicalistic accounts of mental states and properties.
The other issue is the status of reductionism considered as an account of the relation between the psychological and physical sciences.

Contents
Dedication
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Something on the State of the Art
I. Functionalism and Realism
1. Operationalism and Ordinary Language (with Charles Chihara)
2. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanations
3. What Psychological States Are Not (with Ned Block)
4. Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes
II. Reduction and Unity of Science
5. Special Sciences
6. Computation and Reduction
III. Intenstonality and Mental Representation
7. Propositional Attitudes
8. Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother
9. Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology
IV. Nativism
10. The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy
Notes
References
Index
About Jerry A. Fodor

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