[RS] Security for Wireless Sensor Networks

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[RS] Security for Wireless Sensor Networks

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Table of Contents:

1Introduction
1.1 Wireless Sensor Network
1.2 Design Challenges
1.3 Security Issues in Sensor Networks
1.3.1 Broadcast Authentication
1.3.2 Pairwise Key Establishment
1.3.3 Security in Localization
1.4 Orgnization of the Book

2 Broadcast Authentication
2.1 uTESLA Broadcast Authentication
2.2 Multi-Level uTESLA
2.2.1 Scheme I: Predetermined Key Chain Commitment
2.2.2 Scheme II: Naive Two-Level uTESLA
2.2.3 Scheme III: Fault Tolerant Two-Level uTESLA
2.2.4 Scheme IV: DOS-Tolerant Two-Level uTESLA
2.2.5 Scheme V: DOS-Resistant Two-Level uTESLA
2.2.6 Scheme VI: Multi-Level uTESLA
2.2.7 Experimental Results
2.3 Tree-Based pTESLA 42
2.3.1 The Basic Approach
2.3.2 A Scheme for Long-Lived Senders
2.3.3 Distributing Parameter Certificates
2.3.4 Revoking pTESLA Instances
2.3.5 Implementation and Evaluation
2.4 Summary

3 Pairwise Key Establishment
3.1 Key Pre-Distribution Techniques in Sensor Networks
3.1.1 Polynomial-Based Key Pre-Distribution
3.1.2 Probabilistic Key Pre-Distribution
3.2 Polynomial Pool-Based Key Pre-Distribution
3.2.1 Phase 1: Setup
3.2.2 Phase 2: Direct Key Establishment
3.2.3 Phase 3: Path Key Establishment
3.3 Key Pre-Distribution Using Random Subset Assignment
3.3.1 The Random Subset Assignment Scheme
3.3.2 Performance
3.3.3 Overheads
3.3.4 Security Analysis
3.3.5 Comparison with Previous Schemes
3.4 Hypercube-based Key Pre-Distribution
3.4.1 The Hypercube-Based Scheme
3.4.2 Dynamic Key Path Discovery
3.4.3 Performance
3.4.4 Overhead
3.4.5 Security Analysis
3.4.6 Comparison with Previous Schemes
3.5 Implementation and Evaluation
3.5.1 Optimization of Polynomial Evaluation
3.5.2 Evaluation
3.6 Summary

4 Improving Pairwise Key Establishment Using Deployment Knowledge
4.1 Improving Key Pre-Distribution with Prior Deployment Knowledge
4.1.1 A Location-Aware Deployment Model
4.1.2 Closest Pairwise Keys Scheme
4.1.3 Closest Polynomials Pre-Distribution Scheme
4.2 Improving Key Pre-Distribution with Post Deployment Knowledge
4.2.1 Key Prioritization Using Post Deployment Knowledge
4.2.2 Improving Random Subset Assignment Scheme with Deployment Locations
4.3 Improving Key Pre-Distribution with Group Deployment Knowledge
4.3.1 Group-Based Deployment Model
4.3.2 A General Framework
4.3.3 Performance Analysis
4.3.4 Security Analysis
4.4 Summary

5 Secure Localization
5.1 Localization in Sensor Networks
5.2 Pitfalls of Current Localization Schemes under Attacks
5.3 Attack-Resistant Location Estimation
5.3.1 Assumptions
5.3.2 Attack-Resistant Minimum Mean Square Estimation (MMSE)
5.3.3 Voting-Based Location Estimation
5.3.4 Security Analysis
5.3.5 Simulation Evaluation
5.3.6 Implementation and Field Experiments
5.4 A Detector for Malicious Beacon Nodes
5.4.1 Detecting Malicious Beacon Signals
5.4.2 Filtering Replayed Beacon Signals
5.4.3 Revoking Malicious Beacon Nodes
5.4.4 Simulation Evaluation
5.5 Summary

6 Summary and Future Work
6.1 Summary
6.2 Future Work

References
Index