P'eng Te-huai

General Peng's life and career is covered with some very useful material from his time during the Korean War. Of most interest is his earlier career as a counter-insurgent commander dealing with the insurgencies among the Turkmen, Uigaurs, Kazakhs, Kirgizs and Uzbeks during the latter portions of 1949. Makes it clear that the Fourth and Fifth Phase Chinese offensives did not fail because of poor generalship but because of Mao's overly ambiguous insistence on frontal assaults. From peasant to Chinese Marshall, Peng rose with hard work, a knack for fighting and learning about warfare and ideological flexibility when it came to battlefield tactics and strategy. Next to Matthew Ridgeway, he was probably the most accomplished general of the war. Peng quite rightly blames a lack of air power, long supply lines and huge casualties - as well as Mao's overreaching dictums as reasons for the failure of the Chinese to drive the Americans from Korea. Horrified to see himself declared a "Rightist" and a member of "The Military Club," Peng refused to recant and would later lose his life for his honesty. A true warrior and one who gave the United States a run for its money in Korea.