The Macedonian Conflict of 2001 - Problems of Democratic Consolidation

Having declared independence on 8 September 1991, Macedonia, “the only ex-Yugoslav republic to secede non-violently, has been considered one of the bright spots in former Yugoslavia.” Unlike most of the former Communist countries, Macedonia, together with Slovenia, and arguably Lithuania, experienced an evolutionary path to democratic rule. Since gaining independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 Macedonia was influenced by an extremely unfavorable regional environment: a UN embargo against the northern neighbor FR Yugoslavia (the main trading partner, Serbia and Montenegro), a Greek trade blockade, the war in Bosnia and, later on, by the Kosovo crisis and the NATO military action against Milosevic’s regime. However, the Macedonia’s primary challenge of building a state has been to accommodate the ethno-political ambitions of Macedonians (66 percent of the population, according to the 1994 census) and ethnic Albanians (23 percent). During the 1990’s Macedonian political elites clashed with their ethnic Albanian counterparts over the basic idea behind the concept of the state. Various elements in the constitution, the census taking, the laws on education, local self-government, and public display of national minority symbols, the ethnic make-up of the police, army, as well as the public administration, were all contested by Macedonian Albanians in this period. These are all constituent parts of the idea behind the Macedonian republic, the fundamentals, which in all liberal states are accepted by the general public or at least by the principal sectors within. With a major segment of the population challenging the very foundations of the state, Macedonia, before the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement and the subsequent adoption of the amendments to the 1991 constitution could not consolidate its democracy. While Macedonians have insisted on a unitary nation-state Macedonian, Albanians have refused to be considered an ethnic minority in a Macedonian nation-state and have advocated for official bi-nationalism. Although Macedonia recognized the rights of national minorities and promoted pluralism in the media, native-language education, minority civil society organizations, and interethnic power sharing in the national government living standards sank as unemployment soared. Under such circumstances the political transformation was formulated as a zero-sum game, pitting ethnic Albanian grievances against Macedonian fears for “their” country’s security and integrity. Hailed as an exemplary case of successful inter-ethnic co-operation, Macedonia surprised analysts and diplomats when it almost surged into a full-blown civil war in the first half of year 2001. Led by Ali Ahmeti, the previously unknown National Liberation Army (NLA) was a motley group of former Kosovo Liberation Army fighters from Kosovo and Macedonia, Albanian insurgents from the Southeast Serbian regions of Preshevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, young Albanian radicals and nationalists from Macedonia, and foreign mercenaries. From February to August 2001, the NLA organized an armed insurrection against the Macedonian government. Following a prolong warfare and with emotions running high among government officials and ordinary Macedonians and Macedonian Albanians, the danger of civil strife was real. The international community, led by the European Union, reacted swiftly bring to life the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the pacifycation of the NLA. Thus, in contrast to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where its action was sordidly belated, during the 2001 Macedonian conflict the EU proved capable in close cooperation with the U.S. and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to use effectively soft foreign policy instruments to prevent another Balkan bloodshed. The first part of this study argues that the Macedonian consolidation of democracy has not been achieved in the last decade or so since independence due to the unresolved stateness iss