Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games By B. Peleg, P. Sudholter
2007 | 336 Pages | ISBN: 0387257055 | PDF | 3 MB
2007 | 336 Pages | ISBN: 0387257055 | PDF | 3 MB
This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games, and the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. To each solution the authors devote a separate chapter wherein they study its properties in full detail. Moreover, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed. The authors also investigate in separate chapters continuity, dynamics, and geometric properties of solutions of TU games. The study culminates in uniform and coherent axiomatizations of all the foregoing solutions (excluding the bargaining set). Such axiomatizations have not appeared in any book. Moreover, the book contains a detailed analysis of the main results on cooperative games without side payments. Such analysis is very limited or non-existent in other books on game theory.