Learning to Leave: The Preeminence of Disengagement in US Military Strategy (Drew Paper No. 3)

National security strategy (NSS) changes from president to president. These changes are often referred to as doctrines. Some represent explicit grand strategy, while others require examinations of policy to ferret out. Their enduring traits, however, are most important to national military strategy (NMS). What has endured in America’s superpower experience since World War II is that the United States engages forward in times of peace and fights forward in times of war. In this respect, Maj R. Greg Brown’s Learning to Leave informs strategy at the highest stations of power. He notes that strategy is about managing context and that the context of US national security changed with the end of the Cold War, although its organizing framework did not fundamentally change. Through a thoughtful synthesis of history and organizational theory, Major Brown reveals misperceptions that add to the outdated security framework to further hinder disengagement. In the nexus of the end of the Cold War, the peace dividend, and an increasingly expansive NSS, he finds the historical parallel between the NSS and the NMS no longer appropriate, as it leads military and civilian policy makers to overextend the military. The rather counterintuitive conclusion that follows is that to sustain an expansive NSS of engagement, conflicts when they arise—must be planned with an eye on disengagement of military forces at the earliest reasonable opportunity. As strategic military disengagement is anathema to our national security apparatus and military culture, it must demand preeminence in the NMS to ensure timely disengagement. Regarding current conflicts, Major Brown avoids prescriptions. As we approach the historical inflection point between presidential doctrines, however, we have an opportunity to consider if the end of the Cold War, progress in the current struggle against violent extremism, or the global strategic environment of the twenty-first century warrants a reassessment of our national security structures and policies and the relationship between NSS and NMS. Major Brown writes with a command of the facts and a compelling style. This work is in various degrees historical, theoretical, counterintuitive, and shocking. While certainly not an airpower treatise, it offers keen observations and sound lessons on the use of the proper force for the objective, and it resonates with the inherent advantages that airpower provides national security decision makers. Originally written as a master’s thesis for Air University’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), Learning to Leave was selected by the Air University Foundation as the best SAASS thesis for academic year 2006–7. It is a fitting installment for the Drew Papers. I am pleased to commend this excellent study and am encouraged by what it portends for national security thought in the ranks of our Air Force.