Germany's Aims in the First World War

Fritz Fisher "Germany's War Aims in the First World War" dwells on the tremendous amount of material collected primarily from the archives of the Central powers. It deals with one topic, and deals with it in methodical and exhaustive manner - a continuation of policy of War Aims of the Imperial Germany during the period immediately preceding and throughout the First World War. Germany, only united within the memory of the generation of 1914, was fighting the war not only for its rightful place as a European Great Power, but for a leading, pre-eminent place in the European and by extension the World balance of power. Germany was aiming to displace Britain as a traditional power broker in Europe, unite Austria-Hungary and other Central European powers in the economic and geo-political unit known as MittleEuropa, dominate Russia on its Eastern border and France on its Western. Bethman-Hollweg's (Chancellor for most of the War) vision of the post-war World was Germany dominating continental Europe, and 4 Great Powers (Germany, Britain, USA and Russia) sharing the World. France was to be eliminated as a World Power, Britain as a traditional European Power broker, and Russian desires for the warm sea port of Constantinople and expansion into Persian Golf to be forever denied.
Fisher shows an incredible tenacity, determination and consistency of the War Aims policy from 1914 until 1918. Clearly Germany is to be primarily blamed (perhaps together with Russia) for the outbreak of the war; but once the war started her aims never waived. Germany's War aims were essentially annexationist, aggressive and thriving for world dominance. With France she strived to no less then for elimination of that country as a Great Power, with Britain via annexation of Belgium, to deny it security of an external border and expel it from Europe; and with Russia to annex Poland and Baltic States and thus ensure future economic dependency. One can perhaps argue that by historical irony all this came to fruit after two world wars and 90 years of world conflict; but the verdict is clear that Germany was prepared and carried its policy to the bitter end without much regard of international law, civil liberty, conventions of honor and without much sense of humanity.
Fisher points out that essentially autocratic country, with under-developed democratic institutions, with traditions of Prussian militarism, sense of manifest destiny thriving for world dominance, sense of inferiority and ambiguity about its present position - all those complex causes united in German public opinion almost uniformly supporting the War effort and its government aggressive policies. When the end came, sense of betrayal, disappointment and failure catalyzed the war generation to create the seeds for the second conflict 20 years later.
Fisher's sources are primarily diplomatic correspondence, circular dispatches, minutes of the conferences of military and political leaders, speeches and such. The book is careful to use almost exclusively primary sources; thus ensuring accuracy and lack of bias. All throughout, there is a tremendous care taken by the author not to pass judgment and thrive towards the historical objectivity. It is perhaps a somewhat dry read, but, in my view, essential to understand the motivation of policy which God granted not ever to materialize.